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Resumen:  The Directive 2000/78/EU establishes a general framework for equal treatment 
in employment law and prohibits direct and indirect discrimination on several 
grounds, including religion or belief. The Equality Act 2010 implements this 
provision in the UK on the principle of equal treatment, and a rule or dress 
code that targets a specific religious group, such as a ban on Muslim women 
wearing hijab would be direct discrimination. A more neutral dress code which 
applies equally to all employees may have an indirectly discriminatory effect on 
those who wish to wear religious clothing or symbols at work such as a general 
ban on wearing religious clothing. The central issue in English law in most cases 
will be justification and whether the employer had a legitimate aim and if the 
ban was proportionate under Article 9 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR).  In Australian law there is a policy that bans religious discrimi-
nation on an institutional level and there is a free exercise clause under section 
116 of the constitution. There is a more flexible policy because is no protection 
of religious belief in the equality legislation towards the hijab as a right of the 
employee in the workplace. Both jurisdictions have socio-economic as well as 
organisational policies on diversity management informed by a multilevel fra-
mework that contributes to integrating the individuals and organisations in the 
workplace. This paper adopts a comparative approach between the two com-
mon law systems where the UK follows a multinational framework based on 
the Equality Act and the ECHR case law and the Australian accept the federal 
and state law which have concurrent jurisdictions in the legal framework.  
Kerywords:  Directive 2000/78/EU, Equality Act 2010, ECHR Article 9, Indirect discrimi-
nation, Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, Free 
Exercise Clause, Racial Discrimination Act 1975.
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Abstract:  La Directiva 2000/78/CE establece un marco general para la igualdad de trato 
en el empleo, y prohíbe diversas formas de discriminación directa o indirecta, 
incluyendo la religión y las creencias del trabajador. La “Equality Act 2010” (Ley 
de Igualdad de 2010) traspone estas normas al Reino Unido bajo la lógica del 
principio de igualdad de trato. Las reglas o códigos de vestimenta dirigido a un 
grupo religioso determinado, como la prohibición a las mujeres musulmanas 
de vestir hiyab es un caso de discriminación directa; una regulación neutra que 
se aplique por igual a toda la plantilla puede producir una discriminación indi-
recta en aquellas personas que quieran utilizar determinadas ropas o símbolos 
asociados a su confesión religiosa tanto como la prohibición directa de uso de 
dichas prendas. La clave de la ley británica, en la mayor parte de los casos, será 
la eventual existencia de un objetivo legítimo en el empresario y el análisis de 
la proporcionalidad, a la luz del art. 9 de la Convención Europea de Derechos 
Humanos. En la Ley Australiana, por su parte, se prohíbe la discriminación por 
motivos religiosos en un nivel institucional, y se reconoce la libertad de culto en 
la sección 116 de la constitución. La regulación es más flexible, porque no existe 
protección de las creencias religiosas en la legislación de igualdad que ampare 
un derecho a vestir hiyab en el centro de trabajo. Ambas jurisdicciones tienen 
políticas socioeconómicas y organizativas en materia de gestión de la diversidad 
informadas por un marco multinivel que contribuye a la integración en el ámbi-
to laboral de individuos y organizaciones. Este trabajo plantea una aproximación 
comparativa entre los dos sistemas de common law, en el que Reino Unido sigue 
un esquema de multinationalidad basado en la Ley de Igualdad y la Convención 
Europea de Derechos Humanos y Australia acepta la legislación federal y estatal, 
que tienen competencias concurrentes en materia legislativa. 
Palabras clave:  Directiva 2000/78/CE, Ley de Igualdad (Equality Act), artículo 9 de la CEDH, 
Discriminación indirecta, Comisión Australiana para los derechos humanos y 
la igualdad de oportunidades, Libertad religiosa y de culto, Ley de discrimina-
ción racial de 1975.
Introduction 
The right to freedom of religion is a recognised principle of international law which is limited by the 
demands of justice. 1 This has been argued in the courts in the UK  that have had to consider issues 
regarding female employees of the Muslim faith who have adopted an avowed symbol of religious 
manifestation. It affirms an identity for some of the women but it is also presents a separation from 
the mainstream employees who may not have a religious belief. This presents an employer with a 
choice to accept the employee as a member of a minority who has a protected characteristic or to 
make western dress obligatory. The discrimination in the workplace is forbidden by the Equality 
Act 2010 in English law which is superimposed by the ECHR, and is multinational, while the Aus-
tralian law which is also based on common law the federal government and states have promulgated 
statutes that apply to employees and which impact on wearing of religious symbols. The issue which 
better protects the employee in the workplace from indirect discrimination.  
1 The right of all persons to equality before the law and protection against discrimination constitutes a universal right recognised 
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to which all Member States are signatories. Convention No 111 of the Inter- national La-
bour Organisation (ILO) prohibits discrimination in the field of employment and occupation.
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The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
has a framework for the protection of rights. 2  Article 9 states "(1) Everyone has the right to free-
dom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance; (2) Freedom to manifest one’s 
religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others". Article 14 states ‘The enjoyment 
of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination 
on any ground  such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.’
There is further protection under Article 1 of Protocol No 12 to the ECHR is entitled ‘Gen-
eral prohibition of discrimination’. Paragraph 1 states:
‘The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground 
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, asso-
ciation with a national minority, property, birth or other status.’ 3
This obligation is reinforced by Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Article 
104 entitled ‘Freedom of thought, conscience and religion’ Paragraph 1 affirms this duty as follows:
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes freedom 
to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.’5
There is Council Directive 2000/78/EC  that establishes a general framework for equal treat-
ment in employment and work place. 6  Article 2 distinguishes between direct and indirect discrimi-
nation. This has been transposed into English law by means of the Equality Act 2010 that prohibits 
discrimination based on religion or belief. The Act incorporates  the Directive  . The preamble states 
that the Directive applies to the employment practice and labour law and its impact is on the work 
environment where it sets out the duties and obligations of the employer towards the employee such 
as respect for their religious beliefs. 7 It renders unlawful the dismissal of an employee who  practises 
a religion on the ground that he or she refuses to comply with an instruction from the  employer 
2 Signed at Rome on 4 November 1950. All the Member States are signatories to the ECHR, but the European Union has not 
yet acceded as such; see Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454.
3 The protocol was opened for signature on 4 November 2000. Of the EU Member States, it has to date been signed by Austria, 
Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. Only Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia and Spain have so far ratified it.
4 OJ 2010 C 83, p. 389.
5 Article 21 of the Charter is entitled ‘Non-discrimination’. Paragraph 1 states: ‘Any discrimination based on any ground such as 
sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of 
a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.’
6 (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16).
7 Recitals of the Directive 2000/78/EU state (9) Employment and occupation are key elements in guaranteeing equal oppor-
tunities for all and contribute strongly to the full participation of citizens in economic, cultural and social life and to realising their 
potential; (11)  Discrimination based on religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation may undermine the achievement of 
the objectives of the EC Treaty, in particular the attainment of a high level of employment and social protection, raising the standard 
of living and the quality of life, economic and social cohesion and solidarity, and the free movement of persons; and (12)To this end, 
any direct or indirect discrimination based on religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards the areas covered by 
this Directive should be prohibited throughout the [European Union].
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(a private-sector undertaking) that she is not to wear a religious symbol when in contact with the 
customers of the business.
The Australian jurisdiction by comparison has a federal system where the states have their 
enact their legislation that prohibits discrimination in employment. The policy framework of over-
seeing legislation in this sector comes under the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportuni-
ties Commission. The federal Fair Work Ombudsman also provides education and assistance for 
employees and employers on preventing discrimination in the workplace. Section 116 of the Com-
monwealth Constitution confers a guarantee of religious freedom and discrimination is prohibited 
in principle. However,  every state jurisdiction prohibits religious discrimination except South Aus-
tralia and New South Wales but these states have also adopted a precedent from the federal law to 
prevent victimisation in the workplace.  
The research output shows that the wearing of religious symbolism can lead to discrimina-
tion but that it also breeds a victim complex and if there are no plausible reasons such as industry 
practice then it should be allowed in the workplace. The motivation of this study can be justified 
by the choice of 2 legal systems  that compare the United Kingdom with that of Australia which 
are both based on common law. The difference needs to be highlighted that contrasts the equality 
legislation based on precedent which is found in English law and the Australian legal system that 
has incorporated the federal and the state law.  This draws from the standards and, in particular, ju-
dicial, international and national resolutions and conceptualize them in the theoretical framework 
in order to differentiate between direct and indirect discrimination.  
This paper examines the framework of English law that has adopted the EU Equality Directive 
into the Equality Act 2010 and evaluates the laws the protect religious symbolism of wearing the 
hijab, the head gear worn by Muslim women who profess a belief derived from Islamic custom. 8 Part 
A deals with the  religious discrimination in the British labor system and the indirect discrimination 
in the work place. It considers the Equality Act and the interpretation of the Article 9 of the ECHR. 
There is also a distinction between the cases raised at the ECHR and the CJEU.  Part B considers 
the Australian jurisdiction and the impact of the clauses of the Commonwealth Constitution and 
how they are implemented in the states which have their own statutes. The conclusions will analyse 
the common and divergent elements existing between the impact of the UK legal system and the 
Australian legal system on the use of the religious symbol in the form of the veil in the workplace.
 
Part A. Religious discrimination in the British labor system
I. Indirect discrimination and religious freedom  
The legislative framework in English law distinguishes between both the direct and indirect dis-
crimination.9 There is a need to distinguish them in employment law and the protections available 
8 This has different types of veils but the more commonly known is the hijab, the headscarf that covers the hair ; jilbab is an 
unfitted, long sleeved, ankle length gown; the niqab is a term for cloth which covers the body and entire face, leaving only the eyes 
visible; and the burka is an all enveloping robe which covers the entire body except for the eyes which are concealed under a net. 
Fadaw El Guindi, s v hijab.  The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World (Oxford University Press 1995) 108-111.
9 Article 2 of the EU Directive is entitled ‘Concept of discrimination’. It states, in particular:
‘1. For the purposes of this Directive, the “principle of equal treatment” shall mean that there shall be no direct or indirect dis-
crimination whatsoever on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1:
(a) direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would 
be treated in a comparable situation, on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1;
(b) indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons 
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to those with different religious beliefs. These principles have been derived from case law and by the 
reasoning of the judges in discrimination cases when they have come to court. These have impact 
on race discrimination but where the issue was the religious symbols worn by those who practice 
the faith of the claimants. The Courts have interpreted indirect discrimination in the religious 
context where there has been victimisation on account of nationality that also amounts to racial 
discrimination providing it satisfies certain characteristics.  
In Mandla v Dowell Lee 10 there was an appeal to the House of Lords by a pupil belonging 
to the Sikh community who had asserted his right to wear a turban to school as part of his racial 
identity. The  decision of their Lordships  was based on the interpretation of the Race Relations  Act 
1976 section 1(1) (b) (i) and (ii) the issue was if the headmaster of a school in refusing to admit the 
boy unless he removed his turban in order to minimise religious distinctions was guilty of unlawful 
discrimination. The defence was that under section 3 the boy was a  member of a 'racial group . . 
. who can comply' with the rule did not need to show the rule to be 'justifiable irrespective of [the 
boy's] ethnic . . . origins'.    
Lord Fraser held that “a distinct community had to have a long shared history, of which the group 
was conscious as distinguishing it from other groups, and the memory of which it kept alive, and second it 
had to have a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs and manners, often but 
not necessarily associated with religious observance. In addition, the following characteristics could also 
be relevant, namely (a) either a common geographical origin or descent from a small number of common 
ancestors, (b) a common language, which did not necessarily have to be peculiar to the group, (c) a com-
mon literature peculiar to the group, (d) a common religion different from that of neighbouring groups 
or from the general community surrounding it, and (e) the characteristic of being a minority or being an 
oppressed or a dominant group within a larger community”. 11
By applying those characteristics, the Sikhs were deemed as a racial group defined by refer-
ence to 'ethnic origins' even though they were not racially distinguishable from other people living 
in the Punjab. It was not material to the case that the racial and religious minority came under one 
definition of race because it was the overriding characteristic of the ethnic group. The definition of 
an ethnic group consisted of a cultural tradition and long shared history, and other characteristics 
could be relevant also such as religious affiliation. There is subsequent case law that sets out the 
principle of indirect discrimination.     
In "Jewish Free School Case" - R(E) v Governing Body of JFS and Another 12  the issue was did it 
constitute direct racial discrimination under section 1(1)(a) of the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA) 
to impose a criterion for admission to JFS (the Jewish free School as it used to be known) that the 
child applicant concerned be recognised as being Jewish by the Office of the Chief Rabbi of the 
United Congregation of the Commonwealth (OCR). If this applied then such a condition was 
unlawful by reason of section 17, of the RRA which outlawed discrimination in the arrangements 
made for selecting children for admission to schools and permits of no relevant exceptions. 
The House of Lords ruled by 7-2 majority that there had been discrimination “on racial 
grounds” (defined by section 3 of the Act to include the ground of “ethnic origins”). Lord Phillips 
held that "the critical question is whether the requirements of Jewish identity as defined by the 
having a particular religion or belief, a particular disability, a particular age, or a particular sexual orientation at a particular disad-
vantage compared with other persons unless:
(i) that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appro-
priate and necessary, …
10 [1983] 2AC 548
11 p 1066
12 [2010] 2 AC 728, SC
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1976 Act met the characteristics define those who have them by reference to " colour, race, natio-
nality, or ethnic or national origins ?"13
His Lordship stated ruled :
"The difficulties in which the school ensnared itself illustrate the confusion created by the distinction, created 
by anti-discrimination legislation, between discriminating on the basis of religion (which is justifiable) and 
discriminating on the basis of ethnic origin or race (which is not). The school, in excluding the son, was 
enacting a policy which was based on religious precepts. But the impact it had on the son was because of his 
ethnicity. In situations such as there is no bright line between the one and the other. As Lord Kerr observes, 
the school’s policy was unimpeachable and justifiable. That is not to the point. There was direct discrimi-
nation under the Act, and therefore no justification could be advanced. “The breach of the legislation arises 
because of the breadth of its reach”.14 
Lord Hope one of the dissenting judges held that the crucial question was not whether the 
person was a member of a separate ethnic group from those advantaged by the school’s admissions 
policy, but whether he had been treated differently on grounds of ethnicity. His Lordship recog-
nised the right of the Office of the Chief Rabbi (OCR) to define Jewish identity in the way it does 
as a matter of Jewish religious law but "to say [its] ground was a racial one is to confuse the effect 
of the treatment with the ground itself" .15 
Both the above cases invite a more nuanced approach by the judges and it is not in the remit to 
change the law which is for the Parliament to enact. However, it is clear from the judgments that in 
employment law if there was a rule or dress code that targets a specific religious group, such as a ban on 
Sikhs wearing turbans then it would be direct discrimination. If a more neutral dress code is adopted 
which applies equally to all employees it may have an indirectly discriminatory effect on those who wish 
to wear religious clothing or symbols at work. For example, a general ban on wearing religious clothing 
will have a special impact on those whose religious beliefs require them to wear particular items. While 
direct discrimination can only be justified in very limited circumstances, employers can objectively 
justify indirect discrimination by showing they have a legitimate aim and have acted proportionately.
This has been clarified by the Equality Act 2010 that was a consolidated legislation that 
framed into a single statute the Race Relations Act 1976, Disability Discrimination Act 1997 and 
Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 into one statute. This has in its provisions a set of 
protected characteristics that includes religious belief16 and it outlaws both direct and indirect dis-
crimination in the workplace. 17  Section 19 of the Equality Act states : 
(1)   A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion or 
practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's. 
(2)  For the purposes of subsection (1), a provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in 
relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's if: 
13 Para 27
14 Para 124 
15 Para 201
16 Section 4 has established protected characteristics as follows: disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; 
pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; and sexual orientation.
17 Equality Act 2010 prohibits discrimination on account of Religion or belief. Section 10 states: 
(1) Religion means any religion and a reference to religion includes a reference to a lack of religion. 
(2) Belief means any religious or philosophical belief and a reference to belief includes a reference to a lack of belief. 
(3) In relation to the protected characteristic of religion or belief— 
(a) a reference to a person who has a particular protected characteristic is a reference to a person of a particular religion or belief; 
(b) a reference to persons who share a protected characteristic is a reference to persons who are of the same religion or belief. 
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 (a)  A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the characteristic, 
 (b)   it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular 
disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it, 
 (c)   it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and 
 (d)   A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. 
(3)   The relevant protected characteristics are age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage 
and civil partnership; race; religion or belief; sex; and  sexual orientation. 
The EU Equal Treatment Framework Directive 2000/78 that was transposed into English law 
to promulgate the Equality Act establishes a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination. Article 4 of the Directive entitled ‘Occupa-
tional requirements’ provides in Paragraph 1 :
‘Notwithstanding Article 2(1) and (2), Member States may provide that a difference of treatment which is 
based on a characteristic related to any of the grounds referred to in Article 1 shall not constitute discrimi-
nation where, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context 
in which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational 
requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate.’
Paragraph 2 deals with differences of treatment based on a person’s religion or belief in the 
specific context of occupational activities within ‘public or private organisations the ethos of which 
is based on religion or belief ’. This issue of religious discrimination emanating from English law 
has come before the European Court of Human Rights under Article 9 and the appeals from the 
national courts of the EU countries have been decided upon at the CJEU that have dealt with the 
Directive 200/78. These rulings can be distinguished upon the reasoning of the courts.  
II.  Distinguishing the cases in the ECHR and the CJEU
i) European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
It may be noticed that when it comes to the non-discriminatory exercise of freedom of religion 
by an employee working in the public sector the legal impact of the European Human Rights 
Court (ECtHR) is based on ECHR Article 9.  The issue has been explored of the Hijab under 
this provision of a religious symbol worn by women of the Muslim faith. In Leyla Şahin v. Turkey 
18 and Dogru v. France, 19 the hijab (headscarf covering the hair and neck while leaving the face 
uncovered)  was ruled as an act that could be regarded as “motivated or inspired by a religion or 
religious belief ”. 
This principle of non interference has been held with reference to other religions also. In 
Eweida and Others v. The United Kingdom, 20 the conditions were established as to when such inter-
ferences were possible based on the ECHR.  In this case, a woman employed by a private company 
who had to serve the customers in performing her tasks was prevented from wearing a cross. The 
Court found a violation of the applicant’s religious freedom under Article 9 of the ECHR.  It was 
18 [GC], no. 44774/98, § 78, ECHR 2005-XI
19 [GC] no. 27058/05, § 47, 4 December 2008
20 [2013] ECHR 37
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decisive in establishing the restrictions upon the private companies’ to allow their employees reli-
gious freedom for the sake of their company’s public profile. 
In failing to protect Ms Eweida’s desire to manifest her religion by wearing a visible cross at 
work, the UK breached her human rights. The ECHR held that a fair balance had not been struck 
between “Ms Eweida’s desire to manifest her religious belief ” by wearing a visible cross and “the 
employer’s wish to project a certain corporate image”. 21  This could apply also in the instance where 
Muslim women  are actually prohibited from wearing a veil when such policies impose the exclu-
sion of  the headscarf as a matter of policy in the workplace.  The application of the principle would 
require a balancing exercise in the public image of the employer and the aspirations of the employee 
to put on a religious head gear as a matter of religious belief. 
ii) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
While the CJEU’s references to Eweida in its case law are in support of its ruling they do 
not reflect the basis upon which the judgment was made at the Strasbourg Court. On 14th March 
2017, the CJEU issued two rulings which for the first time that clarified the concept of religious 
discrimination  in the context of Council Directive 2000/78/EC, that established a general frame-
work for equal treatment in employment and occupation.  
In Asma Bougnaoui v Micropole22 concerned a design engineer, Ms Bougnaoui, employed by 
a French private IT Consulting Company, Micropole. Following some complaints by Micropole’s 
customers about Ms Bougnaoui’s headscarf, she was asked to remove it on visits to customers and 
after she had refused, was eventually dismissed. It is not clear under the terms of the reference 
whether Micropole’s objections were exclusively based on their customers’ preferences or whether 
they also relied on a company neutrality policy. Prior to the specific complaints which triggered Ms 
Bougnaoui’s dismissal, the issue of the headscarf had indeed already been raised and the very first 
instance, when Ms Bougnaoui met a Micropole representative at a student fair and discussed again 
at the time of her recruitment when she was informed that the wearing of a hijab would not be 
possible when dealing face-to-face with customers. Whether these repeated discussions about the 
headscarf reflected an established company neutrality policy or were hypothetical guidelines by Mi-
cropole management of customers’ preferences was not obvious but the French Court de cassation 
is the correct forum to decide the issue, based on the CJEU findings on the facts.
In this case the Court found a direct discrimination on the ground of religion, since the 
employer’s decision was not based on a general neutrality policy of the company. The customers’ 
wish not “to have the services of that employer provided by a worker wearing an Islamic headscarf” 
could not be considered as a ‘genuine and determining occupational requirement’.23 The issue was, 
therefore, characterized as one of religious freedom (under article L. 1121-1 of the French Labour 
Code) and not as a discrimination question (under article L 1321-3 of the same code) such as 
under Article of the ECHR. Against this background, the Bougnaoui ruling upholds the protec-
tion against religious discrimination under the Directive to cover both religious beliefs and their 
manifestations. This interpretation reflects the concept of “guaranteeing equal opportunities for all 
and contributing strongly to the full participation of citizens” (as per Recital 9 of the Directive). It 
may not encourage the absolute acceptance in the work environment but attempts to eliminate the 
occasions for intolerance.  The religious individuals are left with the option of choosing between 
21 Para 94
22 [2017] Case C-188/15 
23 Para 41
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their religious or work duties which may be a contravention of the ECHR that protects the Right 
to Religious Belief under the Article 9.  
The fact that Islam does not clearly mandate women to wear a hijab or that restrictions on 
religious symbols only affect the manifestation of religious beliefs (the forum externum) while al-
legedly leaving intact the beliefs themselves (the forum internum) is not relevant.24 The CJEU thus 
affirms a broad concept of religion, in accordance with the interpretation of religious beliefs under 
the ECHR. 25 This is an elastic framework for the French courts which still at times tend to define 
religion in restrictive terms as in its Baby Loup case, 26 a plenary assembly decision of 25th March 
2014, when the Court de Cassation in a private employment law case held that a private nursery 
had lawfully required one employee to remove her non-face covering Islamic jilhab at work, in ac-
cordance with the general religious neutrality requirements contained in the nursery’s policy. 27The 
Court  did not consider it necessary to examine whether the restriction amounted to discrimination 
on the ground of religion, on the basis of being satisfied, that following the Procureur général’s non-
legally binding opinion, that the employee concerned was still free to hold her Muslim beliefs. 28
In  Samira Achbita & Anor v G4S Secure Solutions 29 the claimant a Muslim woman worked 
as a receptionist for a security company who was dismissed because she chose to wear the Islamic 
headscarf. Her claim for wrongful dismissal on the grounds of direct discrimination relating to her 
religion was based  upon direct discrimination based on religion within the meaning of Article 2(2)
(a) of Directive 2000/78/EC if that ban is founded on a general company rule prohibiting visible 
political, philosophical and religious symbols in the workplace and not on stereotypes or prejudice 
against one or more particular religions or against religious beliefs in general.
The preliminary remark on neutrality in Achbita on the enforcement of a neutrality policy by a 
private undertaking caused the CJEU to make a finding of no direct discrimination.30 The company's 
"internal rule at issue in the main proceedings refers to the wearing of visible signs of political, philosophical 
or religious beliefs and therefore covers any manifestation of such beliefs without distinction. The rule must, 
therefore, be regarded as treating all workers of the undertaking in the same way by requiring them, in a 
general and undifferentiated way, inter alia, to dress neutrally, which precludes the wearing of such signs.”31 
The CJEU applied its proportionality analysis by reflecting on the question whether or not “it 
would have been possible for G4S, faced with such a refusal, to offer her a post not involving any visual 
contact with these customers, instead of dismissing her”. 32 The Court concluded that precluding wea-
ring of an "Islamic headscarf at work does not constitute direct discrimination based on religion within 
the meaning of Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78/EC if that ban is founded on a general company rule 
24 It is a matter of contention as to whether or not the wearing of Islamic dress is a religious requirement, obligatory on Muslims 
and required by the Koran. This is debated amongst Islamic scholars and Muslims alike. Even where it can be agreed that there is 
some form of obligatory dress requirement, there is little consensus as to what form this should take. T Shadid W and Van Kon-
ingsveld, Muslim Dress in Europe: Debates on the Headscarf, Journal of Islamic Studies, 2005 16:1 pp35-61.
25 Para 30
26 Cass Ass Plén 25 June 2014, (2014) Rec D 1386.
27 For reflections on the case in light of EU requirements, see Myriam Hunter-Henin, ‘Living Together in an Age of Religious 
Diversity: Lessons from Baby Loup and SAS’ (2015) OJLR 1, 11-13, 18. in which the author argues that it would lead to indirect 
discrimination against Muslim women on account of a general requirement of neutrality that is not proportionate because of its wide 
ambit –all staff, without any distinction, are affected by the prohibition which moreover applies across all of the nursery’s activities 
and in all of the nursery’s premises.  it constitutes an indirect discrimination.
28 See also, F Laronze, ‘Affaire Baby-Loup: l’épuisement du droit dans sa recherche d’une vision apolitisée de la religion’ (2014) 
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prohibiting visible political, philosophical and religious symbols in the workplace and not on stereotypes 
or prejudice against one or more particular religions or against religious beliefs in general. That ban may, 
however, constitute indirect discrimination based on religion under Article 2(2)(b) of that directive".33
The finding of indirect discrimination in this case and that of direct discrimination in Micropole 
has been analysed by Myriam Hunter-Henin who observes that the lessons from the recent rulings of 
the European Court of Justice on the Hijab on the question of religious discrimination in the work-
place are contradictory. This is because " Customer preferences might have no say under article 4(1) to 
justify a measure which amounts to direct discrimination but they may justify a measure which only indi-
rectly discriminates against employees on the ground of their religion under article 2(2)(b), … and all that 
is needed for employers to fall under the grace of article 2(2)(b) and escape condemnation under article 4(1) 
is a unilateral internal company rule requiring neutrality from all employees". This will lead to "employers 
to soon introduce such regulations in mass and close the discrimination route to employees".34 
Hunter -Henin states  that "such inconsistency can hardly be resolved by an appeal to the par-
ticular deference owed to French and Belgium secularism". The significance attached to “contact with 
customers” in the G4S ruling portrays religion as a potential source of division and conflict. These un 
trusted " accounts of religion certainly echo recent legal trends in France and Belgium which seek to neu-
tralise visible signs of religion for the sake of social harmony under a new form of securalism entitled, 'New 
Laïcité ', or in more pejorative words, a 'falsified laïcité' or 'distorted laïcité' in law, the concept of laïcité is 
still construed as a principle of State religious neutrality  rather than a tool of religious neutralisation". 35
This implies that if the private citizens have been increasingly subjected to restrictions upon 
their rights to manifest their religion in the French and Belgian public spheres, these legal develop-
ments have "not been based on the concept of laïcité. The special committee set up to consider the issue of 
the wearing of the full veil concluded that the concept of laïcité was not relevant to the issue and the govern-
ment’s text which led to the 2010 French legislative ban on the covering of the face in the public sphere did 
not rely on the notion. Similarly prior restrictions on religious manifestation in the workplace did not rely 
on laïcité, unless the work involved a mission of public service.  Laïcité, had held the Court de cassation, 
could not serve as a legal basis for a restriction imposed in a purely private law employment context". 36
Hunter- Henin contends that having decided that the "wearing of the hijab was a religious 
manifestation covered under the Directive, the CJEU then went on to rule that Ms Bouganoui’s dismissal 
either amounts to direct discrimination under Article 2(2)(a) of the Directive (in the absence of a company 
neutrality policy) or to indirect discrimination under article 2(2)(b) of the Directive (should such neutrality 
policy prove to have been in place). The distinction makes sense. In the former instance, the dismissal directly 
relies on the employee’s religion (to which the wearing of the hijab must be assimilated) whereas in the latter, 
the impact on the religious employee’s rights results from a rule which, albeit neutral, 'puts religious employ-
ees (and especially Muslim female employees) at a particular disadvantage'".  The judgment implies that 
a ban on the Islamic hijab  in the workplace "will amount to unjustifiable direct discrimination". 37
The implication is that in purely private law employment law contexts the religious indi-
vidual rights traditionally have precedence. While deferring to national discretion in assessing the 
proportionality of indirect discriminatory measures, the CJEU indicates that restrictions upon em-
ployees’ rights to manifest their beliefs in the workplace (whether in the public or private sector) 
ought to be justified if they rely on a neutrality company rule. The case law demonstrates that that 
33 Para 44
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such interference with religious freedoms are not allowed to such an extent. In the Baby Loup case, 
the dismissal of an employee who had refused to remove her jilhab was held legitimate and propor-
tionate but only because ostentatious religious symbols were construed as potentially harmful for 
children’s freedom of conscience.
The English Employment Tribunals have followed the precedent of the CJEU by ruling that 
there is no religious discrimination in job interview questions about Muslim interviewee’s dress causing 
a trip hazard.  In Begum v Pedagogy Auras UK Ltd t/a Barley Lane Montessori Day Nursery 38 the Employ-
ment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) dismissed an appeal against an employment tribunal decision that there 
was no religious discrimination against a Muslim interviewee. She was asked by an interviewer about 
the potential for her unusually long religious dress to provide a trip hazard. Ms Begum wears a jilbab, 
a dress that covers her body from neck to ankle. While discussing the need to wear non-slip shoes, one 
of the interviewers had noticed that the jilbab was covering Ms Begum’s shoes and touching the floor. 
The employment tribunal dismissed Ms Begum’s subsequent religious discrimination claim. The appeal 
was dismissed because Ms Begum was never told she could not wear the jilbab that she was wearing at 
the interview, only that she should not wear clothes that might constitute a trip hazard. Ms Begum was 
permitted to wear a jilbab, even at full length, providing that it did not constitute a trip hazard.
In Farrah v Global Luggage Co Ltd (employment tribunal)39 a retailer with branches on Ox-
ford Street and in Piccadilly forced a Muslim employee who came to work wearing a headscarf to 
resign because it wanted to retain its “trendy” image. Ms Farrah, who worked part time for a retailer 
that sells suitcases, is a Muslim, but does not normally wear religious dress. After she began wearing 
a hijab headscarf at work, she was moved from working at the Piccadilly store, which “caters for a 
higher class of customer”, to the Oxford Street store, which was “less pleasant” for her (for example, 
she was required to clean shelves). Ms Farrah resigned after she was threatened with redundancy, 
despite a later increase in the workforce. She said she was given the option of resigning immediately 
with a good reference, or being dismissed “the formal way” and without a reference. Her religious 
discrimination claim was unsuccessful, with the tribunal noting that she should have brought an 
indirect, rather than direct, discrimination claim. However, the tribunal went on to uphold Ms 
Farrah’s unfair dismissal claim, concluding that she was either actually or constructively dismissed 
after being given a clear indication that she had no future.
Whether the discrimination is characterized as direct or indirect, it may be justified by the 
employer. The justification test in case of direct discrimination is a stricter test the difference of 
treatment is based on one of the protected characteristics that may only be justified if it corresponds 
to a genuine and determining occupational requirement, by reason of the nature of the particular 
occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out (article 4(1) Direc-
tive). The justification of an indirectly discriminatory measure on the other hand is only subject to 
the requirements of legitimacy, proportionality and necessity under article 2(2)(b)(i).
Saïla Ouald-Chaib and Valeska David contrast the Eweida judgment with rulings under the 
CJEU and provide the "three important grounds that are contrary to the interpretation adopted in Ach-
bita. These are: (1) the difference between a human right and a business interest; (2) the seriousness of the 
restriction for the applicant; and (3) the lack of evidence on the harm inflicted to the company. These can 
be   examined under the following sub-headings:
(1)   Human right vs. business interest: While the Court in Eweida accepted as legitimate the 
private companies’ wish to project a certain corporative image, it made it clear that this does 
38 (2015) UKEAT/0309/13/RN
39 ET/2200147/2012
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not stand on a same footing with the right to manifest one’s religion. For the ECJ, an em-
ployer’s wish to project an image of neutrality is covered by the freedom to conduct a business 
(Article 16 Charter). This reasoning doesn’t have a place at the ECtHR. Freedom of religion, 
like the prohibition of discrimination, is a human right protected by the ECHR (Article 9); 
the private companies’ interest to project an image is not. The Court thus concluded in Eweida 
that too much weight was accorded to this interest. (§ 94).
(2)   Proportionality requires weighting what is at stake for the applicant: Ascertaining this 
aspect in Eweida, the Strasbourg Court acknowledged “the value [of religious manifestation] 
to an individual who has made religion a central tenet of his or her life to be able to commu-
nicate that belief to others” (§ 94). Moreover, in its necessity test, the Court also consid-
ered the socio-economic harm faced by Ms. Eweida and by other applicant manifesting 
religion in a private workplace. That is, it weighed  the possibility of changing job and the 
seriousness of losing one’s job (§§ 83 and 109).
(3)   Need for evidence of the alleged threat: Of course, balancing presupposes a careful exami-
nation of what is at stake at the side of the employer too. That is why the ECtHR in Eweida 
went on to examine the damage experienced by the company. But the Court didn’t find “any 
negative impact on British Airways’ brand or image.” There was “no evidence of any real 
encroachment on the interests of others” (§§ 94- 95).40
The CJEU frames its proportionality inquiry in the following terms: “it must be determined 
whether the prohibition is limited to what is strictly necessary.” That is “whether the prohibition […] 
covers only G4S workers (Achbita) who interact with customers” (§ 42) 
Ouald-Chaib and David contend that the CJEU pre empted the last question which over-
looks "the  initial crucial questions of proportionality that the ECtHR asked in Eweida?" These 
can be defined on grounds what was the risk " for the applicant and what weight does this have 
in the balancing? How did her religious manifestation threaten the company’s interests and what 
evidence was provided to that effect?"41 There are significant aspects of the Eweida case which may 
be contrasted that are firstly,  the applicant declined British airways’ offer to transfer to a job that 
did not require "visual contact with customers" and secondly, "while this offer, according to the 
ECtHR, could have mitigated the interference, it did not make the restriction proportionate (§§ 
94-95)" which  establishes that, “hiding the employee” is not a solution under the ECHR.  Finally, 
the Strasbourg Court had "rightly found a violation even though it had not been established that 
the company’s uniform policy had put Christians generally at disadvantage (§§ 14-16)".  
The CJEU "blindly accept neutrality policies in private companies to be legitimate, it also considers 
neutrality policies which prohibit employees to manifest their religion to be part of the right to conduct a 
business. The ECJ is more critical in the case of Bougnaoui, where it does not accept that customers’ wishes 
trump employees’ right to manifest their religion. In the case of Achbita, however, such a critical stance is 
missing. At the same time, the critical approach in the former case is made insignificant. Indeed, ultimate-
ly, even though the ECJ does not accept in Bougnaoui that individual customers’ wishes are used as a basis 
for dismissing employees, it does accept, in Achbita, that employers put a policy in place which doesn’t allow 
manifestations of beliefs because of possible non neutral perceptions this might engender with customers". 42
40 Ibid 
41 Ibid
42 Saïla Ouald-Chaib and Valeska David, European Court of Justice keeps the door to religious discrimination in the private 
workplace opened. The European Court of Human Rights could close it. 27/3/17 https://strasbourgobservers.com/2017/03/27/
european-court-of-justice-keeps-the-door-to-religious-discrimination-in-the-private-workplace-opened-the-european-court-of-hu-
man-rights-could-close-it/
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This critique is premised upon "whether dismissing an employee for wearing a headscarf at 
the workplace is an appropriate and necessary means for pursuing a neutral image of the company 
towards customers". The ECJ determination in their view is that "it does. At least, as long it con-
cerns employees with a customer contact job and as long as the policy is applied in a consistent 
manner".43 The ECJ accepted the reasoning unchallenged that employees who are treated diffe-
rently would not be discriminated against, as long as you ‘give them’ the ‘opportunity’ to have a 
back office job. It encourages employers to conceal diversity and to demote people who are visibly 
religious in the ‘closet’ of the company. 44 
III. Essential basis of the Neutrality argument  
The preliminary remark on neutrality in Achbita on the enforcement of a neutrality policy 
by a private undertaking caused the CJEU to make a finding of no direct discrimination. The reli-
gious freedom can be restricted for the sake of “private neutrality” as an acceptable proposition. In 
this case the wearing of the hijab was deemed as a problem because the employee was in constant 
contact with customers who might have objected to her wearing symbols of religious affiliation.  
However, because this was established by a general company neutrality rule by G4S based 
on the customers’ preferences and prejudices that were not accepted on the facts in the Bougnaoui 
ruling. In this instance the employer, Micropole had been more receptive to religious employees 
than G4S and it was concerned about customers’ objections but did not dismiss the employee until 
there were implications. In Achbita  the CJEU suggested that the discrimination suffered by the 
G4S employee ought to be held to be justified because the employer had prevented from the start 
any possibility of a reconciliatory position. The judgment implies that a ban on the Islamic hijab 
in the workplace will amount to unjustifiable direct discrimination unless it relies on a company 
neutrality policy, in which case it will be characterized as justifiable indirect discrimination.
At the ECtHR the neutrality argument is not accepted as a basis to reject the applicants  af-
filiation towards a religion by manifestation of their dress. The acceptance of restrictions to religious 
symbols in the name of neutrality has a narrow interpretation and such restrictions concern public 
institutions, mostly in the educational field, and these are subject to a principle of neutrality with 
human rights. Therefore, in the context of the Strasbourg Court the organisation has to be in the 
public domain in order to attain the protection but it would not be possible for a private undertak-
ing to avail itself by adopting a neutral policy in order to avoid liability.
This has been debated at the ECtHR in Lachiri v Belgium 45 where the issue was that the 
court usher informed the applicant to remove her hijab before entering the courtroom which was 
in accordance with Article 759 of the Belgian Judicial Code that required everyone to remove their 
headgear before entering the courtroom. The applicant refused and was not allowed to attend the 
hearing. The applicant unsuccessfully challenged the decision and the issue before the Court  was 
whether exclusion of the applicant from the courtroom on the sole ground that she refused to remove 
her hijab constituted a restriction of her right to manifest her religion was a breach of the Article  9 
rights. The applicant, in order to support her claim that she could not be subjected to a duty of dis-
cretion in the expression of her religious beliefs, argued not only that she was a mere citizen but also 
that courtrooms are public spaces open to all.
43 Ibid
44 Eva Brems, Analysis: European Court of Justice Allows Bans on Religious Dress in the Workplace at https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/
test-3/2018/5/26/analysis-european-court-of-justice-allows-bans-on-religious-dress-in-the-workplace
45 Application no 3413/09: (2018) 
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The ECtHR accepted that the refusal to admit the applicant to the courtroom on account of 
her refusal to remove the hijab constituted a restriction on the exercise of her right to manifest her 
religion. The Court concluded that the legitimate aim pursued had been the “protection of public 
order” and the necessity of the restriction in a democratic society was first of all that the "Islamic 
headscarf was headgear and not, as in the case of S.A.S. v. France a garment which entirely con-
cealed the face with the possible exception of the eyes. 46
The Court ruled that Mrs Lachiri’s conduct when entering the courtroom had not been disre-
spectful and had not constituted nor potentially was a threat to the proper conduct of the hearing. 
Therefore, the need for the restriction in issue had not been established and that the infringement of 
her right to freedom to manifest her religion was not justified in a democratic society under Article 
9 (2). The Court, however, stated that since in Lachiri, the prohibition was only aimed at the pro-
tection of public order, it will not examine whether it could have been justified by the objective of 
“maintaining the neutrality of the public arena.” 47 The principle of “neutrality” can be defined here 
as the obligation of the state and its institutions, like courts, to be religiously neutral. This requires 
the civil servants, such as judges, who represent the institutions, themselves to be neutral. This duty 
concerns primarily the action of civil servants: they are required first and foremost to act neutrally, 
meaning that they cannot favour some citizens over others for religious reasons nor promote a cer-
tain faith while performing their duties. 48 This was affirmation that whilst a court could be part of 
the “public arena”, it was not a “public place” comparable to a public street or square and “ a court 
is indeed a “public” institution in which respect for neutrality towards beliefs could prevail over the 
free exercise of the right to manifest one’s religion, like public educational establishments”.49 
In some states like France, however, go further than this: they impose on their civil servants 
an obligation to be neutral in their appearance, and not merely in their action, thus precluding 
them from wearing any sign that would reveal to the public that they believe in a certain faith. 50The 
Court has accepted that such a restriction to the right to manifest one’s religion – usually justified 
by reference to the concept of laïcité, which implies an extensive conception of state neutrality – is 
compatible with the Convention, at least for what regards social worker employed in the psychiatric 
wing of a public hospital. 51 In terms of judges, the duty of neutrality is especially strict because of 
the special sensitivity of their vocation and they cannot undermine ", the public’s confidence in the 
ability of the judiciary to render justice independently and impartially. Accordingly, a good case 
can be made that an extensive duty of religious neutrality, as including an obligation to be neutral 
in their appearance, is justified with respect to judges. It can be surmised that the Court would 
consider such a measure as being in accordance with the Convention".52
J. Ringelheim observes that the "private person who enters a courtroom to assist a hearing or 
participate in it as a witness or a civil party does not exercise any official function. Nor do they hold 
46 [GC] (no. 43835/11, §§ 124-36, ECHR 2014 (extracts) [GC] 
47 Para 46
48 The Human Rights Centre in Ghent argued in its third party intervention that based on past precedent a restriction to the 
wearing of a religious sign based on Article 759 cannot be considered to be “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article 9(2) 
ECHR. On the limitations of the neutrality argument and of other grounds to restrict the manifestation of religion, see also, Third 
Party Intervention by Human Rights Centre of Ghent University in  Lachiri v. Belgium, Application No. 3413/09, Available at 
http://www.hrc.ugent.be/third-party-interventions-before-ecthr/
49 Para 45, See Sahin v Turkey no. 44774/98, § 78, ECHR 2005-XI
50 On the distinction between “neutrality of action” and “neutrality of appearance”, see S. Van Drooghenbroeck, “Les transfor-
mations du concept de neutralité de l’Etat. Quelques réflexions provocatrices,“ in Le droit belge face à la diversité culturelle (Bruylant, 
2011) 75.
51 Ebrahimian v. France App No 64846/11 (2015) 
52 On the concept of religious neutrality in the Court’s case law, see Julie Ringelheim, “State Religious Neutrality as a Common 
European Standard? Reappraising the European Court of Human Rights Approach,” Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2017) 6(1) 
doi 10.1093/ojlr/Rww060.
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any deciding power. It is thus hard to see how the fact that their clothing reveals that they have certain 
religious beliefs could generate, among some persons, the fear that their case would not be judged im-
partially. The idea that the mere presence of a person in the premises of a court is a sufficient reason to 
forbid them from wearing a religious symbol in order to safeguard the court’s neutrality disregards the 
very rationale of the neutrality principle, that is, to guarantee that all individuals are treated objectively 
and impartially by the judiciary".53
In employment law the issues that will need to be addressed when balancing the right to wear 
religious symbols is the integration of the employee with other members of staff and the customer 
service that may be required. This will be the factor that determines the neutrality standard applied 
by the employer is reasonable and does impose any obligations that are harsher than the ordinary 
standard.  The approach taken by the CJEU focuses on the direct and indirect discrimination of the 
employee whereas the ECtHR considers the breach of Article 9 freedom of conscience, religion and 
thought. It is apparent from the case law that the manifestation of religious symbols is given a greater 
latitude in the human rights context than when it is pleaded as the breach of the EU law that has been 
incorporated in English law to protect the rights of the employee within the equality framework. 
Part B. Religious discrimination in the Australian labor system
I. Direct discrimination in the work environment
In Australia, national and state laws cover equal employment opportunity and anti-discrimination 
provisions in the workplace.  The laws to create a workplace free from discrimination and victimisa-
tion are composed of the federal legislation as promulgated by the Commonwealth and the state 
legislation enacted by the state Parliaments. Section 116 of the Australian Constitution confers a 
guarantee of religious freedom in the following terms:  
"The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious 
observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a 
qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth".54
In Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v Commonwealth, 55 the Common-
wealth considered that the Jehovah’s Witnesses were promulgating doctrines such as an objection 
to voting on religious grounds that were prejudicial to the defence of the Commonwealth and the 
efficient prosecution of the war. It took action against the Adelaide Company under the National 
Security (Subversive Associations) Regulations, which had been made pursuant to the National 
Security Act 1939 (Cth). Even though the case concerned the dissolution of an incorporated reli-
gious body, the fact that only one judge found the Regulations to be contrary to s 116 (free exercise 
clause) did not mean it could not protect incorporated and unincorporated religious associations 
in principle.
53 Julie Ringelheim, Lachiri v. Belgium: Headscarf ban imposed on a civil party in a courtroom in violation of religious freedom. 
23/11/18 https://strasbourgobservers.com/2018/11/23/lachiri-v-belgium-headscarf-ban-imposed-on-a-civil-party-in-a-courtroom-
in-violation-of-religious-freedom/
54 This Constitutional provision reflects Article 18 of the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights 1966 Article 18. 
It also has parallels with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 1791 of the US Constitution.    
55 (1943) 67 CLR 116.
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Chief Justice John Latham held:
"…it should not be forgotten that such a provision as s. 116 [of the Constitution] is not required for the protec-
tion of the religion of a majority. The religion of the majority of people can look after itself. Section 116 is requi-
red to protect the religion (or absence of religion) of minorities, and, in particular, of unpopular minorities".56
Williams, J stated that this free exercise clause could apply to individuals as well as corpora-
tions.57 The common denominator in the legal framework of workplace discrimination is the focus 
on the relevant characteristic in the religious belief and/or religious activity and the similarity be-
tween the legislative provisions in the areas in which they prohibit discrimination based on the rele-
vant characteristic.58 In each jurisdiction with a prohibition on religious discrimination, the prohibi-
tion extends to employment, education, access to goods services and facilities and accommodation.59 
The Commonwealth enacted the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission Act 
1986 (Cth) (HREOC Act) which provides that religion be dealt within the framework, firstly, 
the Commission is given power to investigate and attempt to conciliate allegations that an act or 
practice of the Commonwealth is inconsistent with human rights, which includes the right to hold 
and manifest religious beliefs. (HREOC Act s 11(1)(f ) and s 3(1)) , Secondly, the Commission can 
investigate and conciliate complaints of discrimination in employment or occupation on a number 
of specific grounds, including religion. (HREOC Act s 31(b)). The decisions of the HREOC can-
not be challenged by means of judicial review.  
Every state jurisdiction except South Australia and New South Wales60prohibits religious dis-
crimination. In most jurisdictions, the prohibition is created by incorporation of religion into a gen-
eral list of characteristics on which it is prohibited to discriminate.61 In Victoria, where ‘religious belief 
or activity’ is included in a list of 16 such characteristics.62 ‘Religious belief or activity’ is defined as:
a)   holding or not holding a lawful religious belief or view;
b)   engaging in, not engaging in or refusing to engage in a lawful religious activity.63 The Equal 
Opportunities Act 2010 sets out the criteria for the determination whether discrimination 
has taken place. These are size, nature and circumstances of the business; resources; business 
and operational priorities; and practicality and cost of measures. 64
56 Para 143-44 
57 Para 155,  Rich J, agreeing with Williams J), 154 (Starke J), 167 (Williams J).
58 The connection between the free exercise of religion and individual rights has been increasingly recognised in academic lite-
rature.  See, Professor Nicholas Aroney “Freedom of Religion as an Associational Right” (2014) 33/1 University of Queensland Law 
Journal 153-186.
59 In Miller v Wertheim,   (2002) FCAFC the Full Federal Court dismissed a claim of discrimination under the Racial Discrim-
ination Act 1975 in relation to a speech made by the respondent (himself Jewish) which had criticised members of the Orthodox 
Jewish community for allegedly divisive activities. The Full Court stated that it could be ‘readily accepted that Jewish people in 
Australia can comprise a group of people with an “ethnic origin”’ (At 14) for the purposes of the RDA, and cited with approval 
King-Ansell v Police (1979) 2 NZLR 53 . This case had accepted the reasoning of Lord Fraser that Sikhs could constitute an ‘ethnic 
group’ and were therefore entitled to the protection of the Race Relations Act 1976 (UK). This case has been applied in Australia in 
the context of determining whether Jewish people are protected by the Racial Discrimination Act 1975.
60 In New South Wales discrimination based on ‘ethno-religious or national origin’ is prohibited: Anti-discrimination Act 1977 
(NSW) s 4 and s 7. This ground has been specifically considered in relation to a complaint made by a Muslim person in Khan v Commis-
sioner, Department of Corrective Services [2002] NSWADT 131. where he stated that he has been discriminated against because he was 
denied halal food in prison. The NSW Administrative Decisions Tribunal found that being a Muslim was not sufficient to constitute 
‘ethno-religious origin’, and that there must be a close tie between faith, race nationality or ethnic origin for the prohibition to operate: 
61 See Anti-discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 7(1)(i); Anti-discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) ss 16(o) and (p), Equal Opportunity Act 
1995 (Vic) s 6(j); Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) s 3; and Anti-discrimination Act 1992 (NT) s 19(1)(m).
62 Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s 6. 
63 Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s4.
64 In New South Wales discrimination based on ‘ethno-religious or national origin’ is prohibited: Anti-discrimination Act 1977 
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The other states have elected a different legislative format to achieve the same purpose and 
have addressed discrimination on the basis of religious belief in separate sections (rather than listing 
it among the prohibited grounds of discrimination).65 The  Australian Capital Territory Discrimina-
tion Act 1991 (ACT) provides:
It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the ground of religious 
conviction by refusing the employee permission to carry out a religious practice during working 
hours, being a practice:
(a)   of a kind recognised as necessary or desirable by people of the same religious conviction 
as that of the employee; and
(b)   the performance of which during working hours is reasonable having regard to the cir-
cumstances of the employment; and 
(c)   that does not subject the employer to unreasonable detriment.66
In Western Australia the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) provides:
(1)   For the purposes of this Act, a person (in this subsection referred to as the ‘discrimina-
tor’) discriminates against another person (in this subsection referred to as the ‘aggrieved 
person’) on the ground of religious or political conviction if, on the ground of: 
 (a)  the religious or political conviction of the aggrieved person; 
 (b)   a characteristic that appertains generally to persons of the religious or political con-
viction of the aggrieved person; or
 (c)   a characteristic that is generally imputed to persons of the religious or political con-
viction of the aggrieved person, 
The  discrimination takes place when the aggrieved person is treated less favourably than in 
the same circumstances or in circumstances that are not materially different. The discriminator 
treats or would treat a person of a different religious or political persuasion.67 The similarity between 
these approaches is a focus on the relevant characteristic which is  religious belief and/or religious 
activity.  There is a further un animity between the legislative provisions is their scope in the areas in 
which they prohibit discrimination based on the relevant characteristic. In each jurisdiction with a 
prohibition on religious discrimination, the ban extends to employment, education, access to goods 
services and facilities and accommodation.68 
The discrimination based on religious has been included in a list of relevant characteristics 
(such as in Victoria), or by provisions dealing specifically with discrimination based on religion 
(such as the Australian Capital Territory and Western Australia). The legislation in South Australia 
(NSW) s 4 and s 7. This ground has been specifically considered in relation to a complaint made by a Muslim person in Khan v Com-
missioner, Department of Corrective Services [2002] NSWADT 131. where he stated that he has been discriminated against because 
he was denied halal food in prison. The NSW Administrative Decisions Tribunal found that being a Muslim was not sufficient to 
constitute ‘ethno-religious origin’, and that there must be a close tie between faith, race nationality or ethnic origin for the prohibi-
tion to operate: 
65 Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) ss 7(1)(h), 8(1), 11; and Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) ss 53-65. 
66 Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s 11.
67 Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) s 53.
68 See Anti-discrimination Act 1991 (Qld); Anti-discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) s 22; Equal Opportunity Act 1995. (Vic) ss 13, 14, 
37, 42, 49-52, Anti-discrimination Act 1992 (NT) ss 29, 31, 41 and 38; Discrimination Act 1991. (ACT) ss 10, 11, 18, 20 and 21; 
and Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) ss 54-65.
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lacked a  prohibition that would have concentrated on religious belief and practice and applied in 
the areas of employment, education, access to goods services and facilities and accommodation. 
The Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (South Australia) did not contain a prohibition on dis-
crimination based on religious belief or practice. Nor is such a provision included in the cur-
rent bill. However, some provisions relating to religion do exist.  There was for religious groups 
an alternative source of protection may be available under the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) 
provisions prohibiting discrimination based on race.69 Race was defined in that Act as follows: 
‘race’ of a person means the nationality, country of origin, colour or ancestry of the person or of any 
other person with whom he or she resides or associates.70
Anne Hewitt in a critique of the lack of clarity in the South Australian legal definition of race 
has given example of the difficulty of tying it with religion.71 This is because the South Australian 
case law "does not assist with interpreting the meaning of ‘race’ in the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA). 
The majority of the available decisions focus on discrimination against aboriginal people, and include no 
analysis of whether aboriginals are a ‘race’ – this is assumed".72 There is one South Australian decision 
concerning racial discrimination against a non-aboriginal person in Richard Kahn v State of South 
Australia73 in which a man of Pakistani origin argued that he had been discriminated against when 
his application for an Aboriginal Education Worker Traineeship was rejected. While the Tribunal 
appears to have accepted that this was, indeed, discrimination on the basis of his Pakistani ancestry, 
the discrimination was not unlawful because the traineeships were a scheme for the benefit of per-
sons of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander descent.
The Equal Opportunity (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2009 provides new grounds that 
includes ' people who wear dress or adornments symbolic of their religion ' . the amendments in this 
statute include discrimination on grounds of race that include those come the province of religion. 
They impact in two areas which in work and education. Chapter 30, Section 1 effects those which 
are applicants and employees; Chapter 31, Section 2 effects the agents and employees; and Chapter 
32, Section 1 impacts on contract workers. 
The Australian study by a government appointed Expert Panel on Religious Freedom has 
stated the " cases illustrate how the existing anti-discrimination laws work to negotiate the intersection 
between the right to manifest religious belief, and the right to non-discrimination. The anchor points for 
the exception are the religious purpose of a body, and either or both of conformity to doctrines, tenets or 
beliefs of a religion, and avoiding injury to religious susceptibilities of adherents of a religion. These are 
matters that are objectively determined. However, even this approach fails to allow sufficiently for the 
particular circumstances of a case. For example, it fails to evaluate how central or important the belief 
is to the religion, how and to what extent any proposed action would infringe it, and how much harm 
might be done by defeating a discrimination claim in the particular facts of a case".74
There have been two anti-discrimination law reform inquiries that have recommended aban-
doning the use of exceptions, including those that presumptively favour religious conduct over 
non-discrimination. Both inquiries suggested relying instead on a general ‘rights limitation’ provi-
69 Prohibition of discrimination on the ground of race, Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) pt 4.
70 Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) s 5. On the basis Lord Fraser held in Mandla v Dowell Lee 2 AC 548 that Sikhs could con-
stitute an ‘ethnic group’ and were therefore entitled to the protection of the Race Relations Act 1976 (UK). This case has served as a 
precedent in Australia in the context of determining whether Jewish people are protected by the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) 
See note 53 
71 Anne Hewitt, "It's not because you wear a hijab, it's because you're Muslim: Inconsistencies in South Australia's discrimina-
tion laws" [2007] QUTLawJJl 4; (2007) 7(1) Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 57 
72 Abdulla v Berkeley on Hindley Street  P/L (2005) SA EOTL  
73 (2005) EOC 93-098
74 Submission by the Discrimination Law Experts to The Expert Panel on Religious Freedom Inquiry: Religious Freedom Re-
view, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 14 February 2018. p 10 
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sion, under which the intersection of religion freedom and non-discrimination would be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis.75 However, the Australian legal system may soon adopt a federal Act in 2019 
that prohibits religious discrimination at federal level.  This is because the Commonwealth govern-
ment has accepted 15 of the twenty recommendations proposed by the Ruddock Review. 76 This 
will amend of the RDA which in section 9 prohibits discrimination on the basis of a person’s “race, 
colour, descent or national or ethnic origin”. Ethnic origin has been interpreted by the courts to 
cover both Sikhs and Jews. (See Jones v Scully) By contrast, Muslims and Christians are not covered 
by the Racial Discrimination Act, as they do not constitute a single ethnic group.
The amendment of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) or the enactment of a Religious 
Discrimination Act (Bill) to make discrimination on the basis of ‘religious belief or activity’ un-
lawful.77 Given the Ruddock Review’s recognition of the powerful message that legislation gives to 
a society the mere suggestion that protection of religion be tacked on to the Racial Discrimination 
Act 1975 (Cth) rather enacted in a standalone act is peculiar. As previously discussed, the Ruddock 
Review also recommended amendments to present exemptions contained in the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984 (Cth) to reduce their scope and accessibility.78  However, the bill has come for criticism 
because there is no provision that allows the manifestation of religious symbols as a human right in 
the work environment.79  
II. Indirect discrimination in the workplace 
The emergent themes in anti discrimination framework in the employment practice in Australia 
that it is accepted that it is integral to the diversity policy within the, organisational structures and 
routines, and the public domain or customer dealings. 80 This evaluation needs an empirical analysis 
in order to arrive at conclusions as to what leads to indirect discrimination. It therefore, requires a 
social legal input with studies aimed at the experience of the Muslim women who have displayed 
their customary head gear in the form of the hijab.  
The prevalent view in Australia has been that while direct discrimination has subsided the 
indirect discrimination has continued in the workplace.81 This confirms the need to focus on indi-
rect and "subtle forms of discrimination", particular, there is a need to take into consideration the 
"multiple influences of gender, ethnicity, religion and pre-migration work on the perceptions and 
75 ACT Law Reform Advisory Council, Review of the Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) Final Report, LRAC 3 FP, 2015; and 
Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 Explanatory Notes, 2012. 18 
ACT Law Reform Advisory Council, above n 17, 99-102; Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, above n 17, 33-3517 .
76 Philip Ruddock (Chair), “Report of the Expert Panel Religious Freedom Review” (18 May 2018) Appendix A: Submissions 
and consultations 109. 112 https://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/HumanRights/Documents/religious-freedom-review-ex-
pert-panel-report-2018.pdf (Ruddock Review)
77 Ruddock Review Recommendation 15
78 Ruddock Review Recommendations 5 to 8
79 The language of exemptions is a historical consequence of the piecemeal approach to the protection of human rights adopted in 
Australia that places religion at a disadvantage. Rather than portraying religions freedom as a valuable human right worthy of protec-
tion, it creates the false impression that religious freedom is an unusual permission to engage in unlawful behavior. It is unfortunate 
that the Ruddock Review did not instead adopt positive language recognising a religious school’s right to select students and staff who 
are mission fit. The Chimera of Freedom of Religion in Australia: Reaction to the Ruddock Review. The Conversation. (Univ of West-
ern Australia) https://www.e-ir.info/2019/01/21/the-chimera-of-freedom-of-religion-in-australia-reactions-to-the-ruddock-review/
80 As Carolyn Evans has shown freedom of religion as protected under international human rights law has both an individual and 
a collective aspect, and the right to manifest religious freedom collectively necessarily implies that it has an organisational dimension. 
Carolyn Evans, Legal Protection of Religious Freedom in Australia (Federation Press, 2012) 35.
81 E. A Deitch,., A.Barsky, , R. M Butz,., S., Chan, A. P., Brief, & , J. Bradley, Subtle yet significant: The existence and impact 
of everyday racial discrimination in the workplace. Human Relations, 56 (11) (2003): 1299–1324.
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actual process of migrants’ transition". 82 There is a presumption in the system that western norms 
are superior and serve to establish the secular values in the work environment. 
The contemporary research conducted by Syed and Pio evaluates three levels of analysis within 
the emergent themes that subsumed: the macro-societal level, (social stereotypes, social support and the 
legal framework); the meso- organisational level, (diversity policies along with organisational structures 
and routines); and the micro-individual level (ethnic and religious bargains in the workplace). The 
study begins with the hypothesis that "while most organisations have been found to be  compliant with 
anti-discrimination legislation, with a tendency to discourage individual or isolated cases of direct discrimi-
nation, subtle forms of indirect discrimination were evident in the experience of those impacted. However, 
organisations can choose to take cognisance of such overtones through policies for diversity management". 83
Syed and Pio argue that the "perceptions of subtle discrimination" in other national and in-
dustrial contexts could be based on the lack of understanding "for the notion of cultural differences 
fading over time with reference to Australian born Muslim women who may face double jeop-
ardy (ethnicity/religion and gender) and first generation Muslim migrant women who face triple 
jeopardy (ethnicity/religion, gender, migration)"; which may also extend to the  "experiences and 
attitudes of Muslim women, such as those who have recently arrived and those of earlier periods"; 
and this can be presumed because the "earlier studies were too undifferentiated in terms of their 
treatment of migrant workers from different countries".84
It becomes apparent that while "strict dress codes or uniform are not enforceable in most 
Australian organisations, there is an unspoken code for personal presentation" which may impact 
adversely on women from minorities. 85  There are a number of key variables that have been identi-
fied and the potential implications for workplace diversity management.  The exclusive focus on 
organisations by holding them solely accountable for diversity policies may be intensely inadequate 
as diversity management is impacted by both macro-societal and micro-individual issues.  The 
workplace experiences of migrant women "are simultaneously shaped by occupational structure, 
legal frameworks of equal opportunity, and social networks of support.  At each  level, particular 
challenges towards diversity are evident". 86
There are multilevel issues and challenges for Muslim migrant women in relation to their em-
ployment in Australian organisations. The issue has become for the employers of managing diver-
sity in the organisation and set it within the division of labour in the structure of the business. The 
research shows that the "management of diversity will continue to be a major task for organisations 
that seek productivity and financial profits from a diverse workforce...and [therefore] foster condi-
tions that promote structural and informal inclusiveness at all levels.” It is, however, acknowledged 
that the conventional framing of the diversity management discourse is based on a preferencing of 
individual differences over social group differences with an explicit reference to a “business case for 
diversity” .87 The data indicate the complex nature of "interrelated multilevel challenges in the la-
82 E.Ogbonna, , & L. C Harris,. The dynamics of employee relationships in an ethnically diverse workforce. Human Relations, 
59(3) (2006): 379–407.
83 Jawad Syed and Edwina Poe, Veiled diversity ? Workplace experience of Muslim in Australia. Asia Pacific Journal of Manage-
ment 27(1) (2009):115-137   
84 Ibid 
85 N Kamenou, & A Fearfull,.. Ethnic minority women: A lost voice in HRM. Human Resource Management Journal, 16(2) 
(2006) 154–172.
86 M., Stockdale, & F. Cao, Looking back and heading forward: Major themes of the psychology and management of workplace 
diversity. In M. Stockdale & F. Crosby (Eds.). The psychology and management of workplace diversity:(2004)  298–316. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers.
87 S Nicholas,., A Sammartino, J., O’Flynn, A.Ricciotti, , K.Lau, , & N Fisher,. The business case for diversity management. 
Research Report produced by The Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs in cooperation with the 
Australian Centre for International Business, Melbourne.(2001.)
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bour market which requires a much deeper understanding of migrant women’s ethnic and religious 
customs, and the need to go beyond a simplified official 'success story' narrative of skilled migration 
in Australia". 88
This empirical analysis based upon the experiences of the work environment is defined by a 
combination of issues and challenges within the framework of macro-societal, meso-organisational 
and micro- individual levels. These are productive means of evaluating the cultural differences 
between the prevailing organisational approaches towards diversity management, and the issues of 
multiple and intersecting ethnic and religious factors. They establish the policy framework of the 
Commonwealth government's priority in dealing with the "economic or business benefits of diver-
sity, focused on migrant workers’ skills and qualifications" rather than accommodating their specific 
needs such as religious manifestation expressed in their external appearance.  
Conclusion 
There are common and divergent elements existing between the treatment provided by the UK legal 
system and the Australian legal framework  on the use of the veil in the workplace and these depend 
on the incorporation on the multinational laws that have been adopted in the national law. In the 
English law the race relations legislation was the springboard for cases that came before the court 
and which distinguished between the direct and in direct discrimination. The racial discrimination 
can be extended to religious discrimination when minorities have a characteristic that needs protec-
tion in the law. This is basis upon which the Equality Act was framed which transposed European 
Equality Directive into domestic legislation and set out religion as one of the nine protected charac-
teristics. The ECHR has also been adopted into the UK framework and it protects the religious be-
liefs under the Article 9 of the Convention. This has been applied in cases of discrimination in the 
wearing of religious symbols and there is strict duty imposed on the employer to respect the right 
of the employee to wear the veil in the workplace. The provision does not recognise the concept of 
direct or indirect discrimination by the employer and instead there is proportionality in balancing 
the right against the duties on the employer. 
In Australia there are multi national rights that have been adopted but, by contrast, there is a 
constitutional provision in the form of Section 116 Free Exercise Clause that is based on the same 
principle as the First Amendment in the US Bill of Rights. This prescribes every religion equal pro-
tection while not upholding any particular belief as legally superior in treatment of its adherents. 
The Section can invalidate any law that is enacted but it has not been invoked to void state legisla-
tion. There is also the existence of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) which is significant 
because while the Commonwealth can enact discriminatory legislation provided that a statutory 
power exists, the states would find it onerous given possible inconsistency between such legislation 
and the RDA.  
Section 9 of the RDA, prima facie, prohibits distinctions based on race, colour, descent or 
national or ethnic origin which impair the exercise of human rights and section 10 provides for 
equality before the law, denying the validity of laws which mean that a person with these characte-
ristics does not enjoy the same rights as of another race. However, there is debate as to the extent 
to which these provisions could apply to discrimination based on religion, rather than on race, and 
the Commonwealth has not yet amended the provisions of the Act to enshrine religious belief in 
its contents. 
88 C. Ho, , & C. Alcorso,. Migrants and employment: Challenging the success story. Journal of Sociology, 40(3)( 2004) 237–259.
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The English law provides a more elastic determination of the 'neutrality' of the employer in 
terminating the employment based on indirect discrimination. The employer has to consider the 
specific task in the occupational environment where the religious symbol is worn and also has to 
balance factors such as not losing customers or grounds of health and safety. In Australia reform has 
been piecemeal and laws purports to be neutral as between the employer and the aggrieved party. 
The objective of the Commonwealth government has been to create the space for business activity 
in the workplace and has been less inclined towards promulgating legislation that protects religious 
beliefs in the workplace. It has left it to the state legislatures to enact their own laws that infringe 
the religious beliefs and this includes the wearing of veils in the workplace and, consequently, there 
is less case than in the English courts.  
The common law systems in both England and Australia are a mirror in terms of the ap-
plication of anti discrimination laws after international laws have been endorsed in their equality 
framework. It is important that the legislation does not create a victim complex in cases of religious 
symbolic discrimination. If those who chose to make cultural statements by projecting their apparel 
then they be discriminating themselves and conservatism must not be confused with piety.  It is 
necessary for the courts to interpret the law that is objective in all circumstances in instances where 
facts  meet the norms of conduct as in the work place.  
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